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The Burger Court's treatment of the standing requirement has
been, at best, erratic.1 Access has, on occasion, been liberally granted.
2
More often, the doctrine has been employed without consistent ration-
ale to fence out disfavored federal claims.' This vacillation has created
a body of article III decisions that ranks among the most uniformly
criticized of the entire Burger Court legacy."
This much said, last summer's decision in Allen v. Wright5 can
hardly be considered surprising. In Allen, parents of black school chil-
dren were denied standing to challenge Internal Revenue Service guide-
lines that allegedly enabled racially discriminatory private schools to
obtain tax-exempt status.' At first blush, Allen appears to be merely
another case in which the Supreme Court has raised a jurisdictional
hurdle to bar a claim designed to force a government entity to toe the
t Professor of Law, University of Florida, Gainesville. B.A. 1973, Oklahoma
State University; J.D. 1976, University of Texas.
1 See, e.g., K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.00 (Supp. 1982);
Chayes, The Supreme Court: 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the
Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REv. 4, 14-22 (1982); Davis, Standing, 1976, 72 Nw.
U.L. REV. 69, 69-70 (1977).
1 See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 81
(1978) (residents near nuclear power plant granted standing to challenge congressional
limitation on nuclear accident liability); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
62 (1976) (physicians granted standing to challenge criminal abortion statute based on
threat of future prosecution); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (student environmentalists granted standing
to challenge ICC approval of freight rate increases on grounds that higher rates might
discourage recycling and increase consumption of natural resources, thereby harming
plaintiffs' aesthetic and recreational interests in nearby camping areas).
' See, e.g., Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83 (1981) (inmates denied standing to
sue state officials for blocking issuance of warrants to prison guards for unnecessary
beatings); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (builders, taxpayers, potential resi-
dents, and neighborhood association denied standing to bring exclusionary zoning
claim); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (mother of illegitimate
child denied standing to challenge child support laws enforced only on behalf of legiti-"
mate children).
4 See, e.g., Fallon, OfJustidability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes
on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 17 & n.91, 42 n.227 (1984);
Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CA-F. L. REv. 68, 68 n.3 (1984) (collecting sources
critical of standing doctrine).
5 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
6 Id. at 3319, 3326.
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constitutional mark. That alone is hardly worthy of comment.'
Yet Allen may prove to be a watershed. Without explanation, and
unsupported by two decades of decisions and commentary,8 the Allen
Court has ruled that the requirements of standing are to be interpreted
primarily by reference to "separation of powers principles."9 At the
very least, Allen has introduced a new factor into the already complex
standing calculus. At most, Allen may portend a major tightening of
judicial access by the Supreme Court in the name of deference to other
branches of government.
Part I of this Article centers on Allen's separation of powers pre-
mise. Not only is the introduction of justiciability analysis at odds with
the development of the standing doctrine, it misperceives the require-
ment's very function. Rather than focusing on the litigant's stake in the
controversy (traditionally the core of any standing inquiry),"0 Allen
seems to call for dismissal under a hybrid doctrine that offers no mean-
ingful examination of either the litigant's interest or of separation of
powers principles.
Part II argues that Allen takes the development of standing doc-
trine in exactly the wrong direction. Allen neatly caps a broader pat-
tern of Burger Court standing decisions that either openly or covertly
7 A number of other Burger Court opinions have used standing to bar, claims
against governmental officials or practices. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95 (1983) (victim of police chokehold denied standing to enjoin its continued use);
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (taxpayers denied standing to challenge government gift of
surplus property to church-affiliated college); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976)
(minorities denied standing to challenge racially directed police brutality); United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (taxpayer denied standing to demand public
accounting of CIA expenditures).
8 Early decisions often did not delineate the various strands of justiciability analy-
sis. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 140-41
(1951) (opinion of Burton, J., joined by Douglas, J.); id. at 150-60 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480-89 (1923).
Since the early 1960's, however, the standing inquiry has been separated from
other article III concerns. See infra text accompanying notes 39-52. Several modern
standing cases have discussed separation of powers principles as an underlying justifica-
tion for the article III "case or controversy" limitation of federal court jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Allen, 104 S. Ct. at 3345 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471-76 (1982);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-500 (1975); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-97
(1968). No case other than Allen, 104 S. Ct. at 3330 n.26, however, has explicitly
suggested that separation of powers principles be used to interpret or give meaning to
the injury, causation, and redressability requirements of the standing determination. In
so doing, Allen brings separation of powers analysis out of the prudential realm and
squarely into the article III constitutional inquiry.
9 104 S. Ct. at 3330 n.26.




mix various strands of justiciability analysis. The standing hurdle has,
over the course of the last decade, been raised or lowered to accommo-
date the various dictates of federalism, separation of powers, equitable
restraint, and the appeal of particular claims on their merits. Neither
standing nor the different interests it has been molded to serve have
fared well in the process. Standing guidelines have been rendered in-
comprehensible precisely because they already carry too much baggage.
Measuring the appropriate role of the federal judiciary or the desirabil-
ity of substantive claims has overburdened a "threshold"" requirement
designed to examine the personal stake of the litigant. Allen will thus
serve to move standing doctrine further away from clarity, insuring that
standing's "intellectual crisis"'" will get worse before it gets better.
I. ALLEN V. WRIGHT
In its 1983 Term, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
racially discriminatory private schools could not qualify for tax-exempt
status. 3 The complaint in Allen seemed to present the Court with its
next logical step. Parents of black children attending various public
schools brought a nationwide class action to challenge the effectiveness
of the IRS guidelines designed to exclude discriminatory schools. Ac-
cording to the complaint, the school district of each of the parents was
presently engaged in the agonizing process of desegregation. 4 That
process, they claimed, was impaired by the existence of private schools
in each of the districts, typically begun at the same time as the desegre-
gation plan, that discriminated against black students and enabled
white students to leave the public schools. 5 The crux of the Allen com-
plaint was that the IRS procedures fostered and encouraged discrimina-
tory private schools, thereby limiting the plaintiffs' opportunity to ob-
tain an integrated education.'"
" Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (calling standing a "threshold ques-
tion in every federal case").
12 J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW 1
(1978).
13 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). Bob Jones involved
two cases in which fundamentalist Christian schools were denied tax exemptions by the
IRS. Bob Jones University, the plaintiff in one of the cases, prohibited interracial dat-
ing or marriage among its students, claiming that such relations were prohibited by the
Bible. The university filed suit seeking a refund of tax payments.
14 See Allen, 104 S. Ct. at 3321.
15 See id. at 3321-22, 3335-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 3343 n.2 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
18 See id. at 3322. The direct impact of discriminatory private schools on desegre-
gation efforts was apparent from the complaint. For example, in Prince Edward
County, Virginia, only 64 white school children remained in public schools after deseg-
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Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged Revenue Procedure 75-50,
which required schools applying for tax-exempt status to adopt a " 'ra-
cially non-discriminatory policy. . that is made known to the general
public,' " and annually to certify that the school had followed that pol-
icy.17 This adopt-and-certify-without-necessarily-implementing stan-
dard, the Allen plaintiffs claimed, allowed private schools to discrimi-
nate in fact while retaining tax-exempt status. Accordingly, the
plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment that the challenged IRS
practices were illegal and a permanent injunction requiring the IRS to
implement substantially more stringent nondiscrimination guidelines.1 8
Over two bitter dissents, 9 the Court dismissed the suit for lack of
standing.
Justice O'Connor authored the majority opinion. As in most Su-
preme Court standing decisions of the past decade, the core article III
requirement was described as a three-part showing of "personal injury
fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely
to be redressed by the requested relief."20 The plaintiffs easily met the
personal injury requirement through allegations of harm to their op-
portunity to receive an integrated education.21 They failed, however, to
regation, while 1311 attended private Prince Edward Academy. See Brief of the
NAACP as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 22 n.14, Allen v. Wright, 104
S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
'7 Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587, quoted in Allen, 104 S. Ct. at 3319-20.
'8 See 104 S. Ct. at 3322-23. The plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring the
IRS to deny tax-exempt status to all private schools in desegregating school districts
that (1) have insubstantial minority enrollments, (2) were established or expanded at
the time of desegregation, and (3) either were found racially discriminatory in judicial
or administrative proceedings or were unable to demonstrate that they did not provide
segregated educational opportunities for white students seeking to avoid integrated pub-
lic schools.
The IRS Commissioner conceded that the existing guidelines were ineffective and
indefensible. See 104 S. Ct. at 3334 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In settlement negotia-
tions in 1979, the IRS had agreed to adopt guidelines (revenue procedures) nearly
identical to those requested by the plaintiffs, but Congress refused to approve or fund
enforcement of the modified guidelines. See id. at 3323 & nn.15-16; 44 Fed. Reg. 9451-
55 (1979) (proposed revenue procedure); 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978) (proposed reve-
nue procedure).
19 Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens (joined by Justice Blackmun) filed spirited
dissents. See 104 S. Ct. at 3333-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 3342-48 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Justice Marshall took no part in the decision.
20 Id. at 3325 (following Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).
21 All participating Justices agreed that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged in-
jury. See id. at 3328; id. at 3335-36 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 3342 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). In fact, the majority conceded that the "children's diminished ability to
receive an education in a racially integrated school . . . is, beyond any doubt, not only
judicially cognizable but ...one of the most serious injuries recognized in our legal
system." Id. at 3328 (citations omitted).
The Allen majority addressed two other injuries alleged by the plaintiffs: that they
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show that their injuries were fairly traceable to the actions of the IRS.
The "line of causation" between IRS policy and the effective desegre-
gation of the litigants' schools was "attenuated at best."22 Whether a
change in the IRS guidelines would lead school officials to alter their
discriminatory policies or motivate parents to send their children back
to the public schools was "pure speculation. '23 Similarly uncertain was
the likelihood that a "large enough number of the numerous relevant
school officials and parents would reach decisions that collectively
would have a significant impact on the racial composition of the public
schools" attended by plaintiffs' children.24 The causation component of
the standing hurdle thus proved fatal to the plaintiffs' claim. 5
One may easily fault the Allen Court's application of standing
doctrine. 26 The "fairly traceable" requirement was again employed in
were harmed by the unconstitutionality of the government's conduct, and that they suf-
fered denigration from the government's grant of tax-exempt credentials to discrimina-
tory schools. The first allegation was held too abstract, see id. at 3326, and the plain-
tiffs were not permitted to raise the second because their children had not applied for
admission to the private schools, see id. at 3322, and thus personally had not been
denied equal treatment. See id. at 3327.
22 Id. at 3328.
23 Id. at 3329.
24 Id.
21 Id. Justice O'Connor's opinion makes clear only that the second prong of the
standing inquiry-the requirement that the harm be "fairly traceable" to defendant's
actions-was not met. The opinion also argues that courts should separate the "fairly
traceable" and "redressability" components of the standing inquiry. Id. at 3326 n.19.
This footnote implies that plaintiffs may have met the redressability hurdle. See id.
("Even if the relief respondents request might have a substantial effect on the desegre-
gation of public schools . . ").
Even after explicitly separating the inquiries, .however, Justice O'Connor recom-
bines them. Her entire opinion is designed to show that the plaintiff's harms were not
"fairly traceable" to the IRS policy, yet she concludes that standing was lacking be-
cause "'the plaintiff who seeks to invoke judicial power [must] stand to profit in some
personal interest.'" Id. at 3333 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976)). This conclusion is redressability analysis. See C. WRIGHT,
LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 13, at 68 n.43 (4th ed. 1983); Nichol, Causation as a
Standing Requirement: The Unprincipled Use ofJudicial Restraint, 69 Ky. L.J. 185,
193-201 (1980-81); see also Community Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239, 1245
n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (distinguishing between "redressability" and "fairly traceable
causation" requirements), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2450 (1984).
' See, for example, the cogent dissents filed by Justices Brennan and Stevens. 104
S. Ct. at 3333 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 3342 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The out-
come in Allen seems diametrically opposed to the Court's holdings in Norwood v. Har-
rison, 413 U.S. 455, 465-66 (1973), and Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), affg
mem. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971). In his Allen dissent,
Justice Brennan took apparent pleasure in quoting from the Chief Justice's opinion in
Norwood:
"We do not agree with the District Court in its analysis of the legal conse-
quence of this uncertainty [whether children would withdraw from private
schools if free textbooks were eliminated], for the Constitution does not
permit the State to aid discrimination even when there is no precise
19851
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an unduly rigorous fashion.27 Since this standard continues to be given
causal relationship between state financial aid to a private school and
the continued well being of the school."
104 S. Ct. at 3338 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Norwood, 413 U.S. at 465-66)
(emphasis added by Brennan, J.). Justice O'Connor's response was an ineffectual at-
tempt to distinguish the Norwood plaintiffs from the Allen plaintiffs because the former
were enforcing rights created by an earlier court school desegregation decree. See 104 S.
Ct. at 3331.
The gist of the plaintiffs' causation argument in Allen, however, was simple: tax-
exempt status makes private schools economically more attractive. The IRS procedures
allow private schools to retain that status while practicing racial discrimination. The
IRS procedures therefore foster and encourage private discriminatory schools. The for-
mation and expansion of these schools in plaintiffs' school districts harms the process of
desegregation. See id. at 3322; see also supra note 16.
27 Similarly rigorous applications can be found in Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-43 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504-08 (1975).
Even accepting this harsh standard as appropriate, the proper result, as Justice
Brennan recognized, would have been to remand the case for the plaintiffs to amend
the eight-year-old complaint. See Allen, 104 S. Ct. at 3338 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). A rigorous causation requirement could not have been foreseen from the usual
rules of federal pleading. As the Court stated in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455
U.S. 363, 377-78 (1982):
Under the liberal federal pleading standards, . dismissal on the plead-
ings is inappropriate at this stage of the litigation. At the same time, we
note that the extreme generality of the complaint makes it impossible to
say that respondents [plaintiffs] have made factual averments sufficient if
true to demonstrate injury in fact. Accordingly, on remand, the District
Court should afford the plaintiffs an opportunity to make more definite
the allegations of the complaint.
A strict causation standard is particularly troublesome in cases where the causa-
tion issue closely approximates the claim on the merits. If IRS procedures do encourage
private segregation they would certainly be illegal. Cf Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369 (1967) (California constitutional amendment that authorized discrimination in
housing found unconstitutional). The crucial question on the merits of the Allen claim
was whether the government created a subsidy that in fact encouraged white students to
leave the public schools. Under the-majority's application of the traceability require-
ment, the connection between government action and the enrollment of white students
in discriminatory private schools must be alleged in such a specific manner that there
could be no speculation as to its truth. As a result, the plaintiffs were required to prove
their case in the complaint without benefit of discovery or trial.
The traceability requirement, however, is not always identical to the claim on the
merits. In Simon, for example, the litigants sought to demonstrate that a newly adopted
IRS policy was contrary to congressional intent. 426 U.S. at 33-34. The merits of that
claim were quite separate from the traceability of the plaintiff's injury-diminished
ability to receive free emergency hospital care-to the new policy. See id. at 33.
The causation argument in Allen was also more easily made than in Simon. To
obtain tax-exempt status in Simon, the hospitals were required to serve indigents with-
out charge, id. at 30, thereby incurring expenses that offset the economic advantages of
tax-exempt status. The private schools in Allen, however, were not required to make
additional expenditures, thus providing a purer economic incentive. Similarly, the
redressability argument in Allen was more certain than in Simon. The success of plain-
tiffs' suit would have yielded one of two results: either discriminatory private schools
would lose their tax exemption, thereby ending the government subsidy that facilitated
their expansion, or the schools would cease to discriminate. Either way, plaintiffs' in-
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a more lenient construction on other occasions," the decision looks very
muqh like a rejection of the plaintiffs' claim on the merits."9 The opin-
ion's tortured treatment of causation, however, is less troubling than its
expressed reliance on separation .of powers analysis. Had the Court
merely manipulated existing standing principles to reach the desired
result, standing doctrine as a whole would have remained basically un-
changed. 30 The Allen opinion makes clear, however, that the standing
inquiry itself is to be expanded."i
According to Justice O'Connor, standing doctrine is "built on a
single basic idea-the idea of separation of powers. '3 2 Unlike refer-
ences to separated powers in earlier standing cases, 33 O'Connor's opin-
ion explicitly notes that separation of powers concerns do not underlie
article III jurisdictional limitations merely in the sense that plaintiffs
who lack standing are outside the area of judicial responsibility. 4
Rather, the three components of article III standing are themselves to
be interpreted in light of "separation of powers principles.1
3 5
The Allen plaintiffs, for example, were found to have stated no
jury would be redressed. In Simon, by contrast, the hospitals might have preferred to
give up their tax exemption rather than provide free treatment for indigents, leaving
the plaintiff's injury unredressed. See Brief of the NAACP as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondents at 44-46, Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984). Of course, the
causation and redressability reasoning in both Allen and Simon was directly at odds
with Congress's theory in granting tax exemptions: the five Supreme Court Justices
joining the majority opinions in these cases seem to believe that private parties do not
change their behavior to reduce their taxes.
28 See, e.g., Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 366-68 (1980) (upholding standing of
respondents to intervene in challenge to interpretation of federal irrigation statute on
grounds that application of the statute would lower price of land that respondents
sought to purchase, although the plaintiffs could not establish their financial ability to
make the purchase); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce-
dures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (finding sufficiently traceable the claim that in-
creased freight rates would discourage recycling thereby using more natural resources
and causing plaintiffs aesthetic harm in their outdoor recreational activities in local
wilderness areas).
29 See supra note 27.
The inconsistency of the Burger Court's application of the injury-causation-
redressability sequence is a story often told. See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 1, at 14-22;
Nichol, supra note 25, at 185-213. See generally Tushnet, The New Law of Standing:
A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977). Given this inconsistency,
there is increasing evidence that lower federal court judges have begun to follow the
standing principles as announced but not as applied by the Justices. See, e.g., Interna-
tional Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 809-12 (D.C. Cir.
1983); Community Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239, 1246-52 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
a' See 104 S. Ct. at 3330 n.26.
32 Id. at 3325.
3 See supra note 8.
Justice O'Connor expressly disagreed with this characterization of her separa-
tion of powers analysis in Justice Stevens's dissent. Compare 104 S. Ct. at 3330 n.26
(majority opinion) with id. at 3345 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 3330 n.26.
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fairly traceable injury in part because the recognition of such injury
would " 'have the federal courts as virtually continuing monitors of the
wisdom and soundness of Executive action.'"36 Separation of powers
considerations are not to be "considered only under a distinct jus-
ticiability analysis,' 3 7 but pervade the standing determination itself.
The principle of granting each branch of government wide latitude in
conducting its internal affairs "counsels against recognizing standing in
a case brought . . . to seek a restructuring of the apparatus established
by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties."3 The version of
standing set forth in Allen thus not only takes the plaintiffs' interest as
its focus, but filters that interest through a lens to measure the appro-
priate role of the federal judiciary in a tripartite system of government.
The propriety and consequences of such a hybrid doctrine will be ex-
amined in the remainder of this Essay.
A. The Anomalous Mixture of Standing and Separation of Powers
The first comment one might make about this infusion of separa-
tion of powers analysis is that it departs sharply from standing law as
we have come to know it. American law of case or controversy recog-
nizes that jurisdiction in federal courts may be barred for a variety of
reasons: a litigant may lack standing; a suit may call for an advisory
opinion;39 it may be collusive, 40 lack subject matter jurisdiction,4" or
run afoul of the political question doctrine.42 Only the requirement of
standing, however, exclusively evaluates the litigant's interest or stake
in the outcome. Decisions spanning at least two decades, including
those of the Burger Court until Allen,4' have expressed this view of
88 Id. at 3329 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)).
37 Id. at 3330 n. 26.
38 Id. at 3330.
See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, (1911) (challenge by Chero-
kee Indians to constitutionality of federal statute affecting division of their lands dis-
missed as advisory in absence of actual controversy).
40 See, e.g., Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892)
(friendly parties may not bring suit to challenge governmentally established railroad
fares).
41 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198-204 (1962) (discussing subject mat-
ter jurisdiction); Osborn v. President, Directors, & Co. of the Bank of the United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (upholding subject matter jurisdiction over suit
by federal bank against officers of a state).
41 See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-06 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) (vacating and remanding with directions to dismiss Senator Goldwater's
challenge" to President Carter's termination of United States-Taiwan mutual defense
treaty as involving a nonjusticiable political question).
43 See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72
(1978); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) ("[Tjhe standing question is




The modern concept of standing was given its most thorough ex-
planation in Flast v. Cohen.44 Chief Justice Warren attempted in Flast
to separate the various strands of jurisdictional inquiry previously
grouped under the umbrella of article III. Relying on Baker v. determi-
nation that the gist of standing is whether the plaintiff has the requi-
site "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,'4 5 he separated
the question of standing from the justiciability of the claim.48 Specifi-
cally rejecting the government's claim that taxpayer standing to chal-
lenge government expenditures was barred by the separation of powers
doctrine, the Court in Flast held:
The fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the
party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and
not on the issues he wished to have adjudicated ...
• .. The question whether a particular person is a
proper party to maintain the action does not, by its own
force, raise separation of powers problems related to im-
proper judicial interference in areas committed to other
branches of the Federal Government.
4 7
This view accords with descriptions of standing doctrine offered by
prominent academic commentators. Hart and Wechsler's classic work
on the federal courts4 8 suggests that the standing inquiry should ex-
amine the "nature and sufficiency of the litigant's concern with the
subject matter of the litigation, as distinguished from problems of the
justiciability-that is, the fitness for adjudication-of the legal ques-
tions which he tenders for decision."'49 It is true, of course, that the
history of standing has been profoundly marked by judicial manipula-
versy' as to warrant his invocation of federal court jurisdiction .... ") (quoting Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973) (stressing importance of per-
sonal injury to litigant in creating standing, because such injury "gives a litigant direct
stake in the controversy"); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972) (standing
turns on whether a "party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable contro-
versy"); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968) ("The question whether a particular
person is a proper party to maintain an action does not, by its own force, raise separa-
tion of powers problems . . ").
44 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
45 Id. at 204.
48 Flast, 392 U.S. at 99-100.
47 Id.
8 P. BATOR, D. SHAPIRO, P. MISHKIN & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHS-
LER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973).
49 Id. at 156.
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tion to serve unstated ends. Yet the only meaningful consensus to be
drawn from the entire standing literature is that the determinative issue
is supposed to be " 'whether [the plaintiff] . . . has a sufficient per-
sonal interest,' "50 and not concern for separation of powers, federalism,
or the attractiveness of the claim on its merits.5" At the jurisdictional
stage, separation of powers interests have long been considered the bai-
liwick of the political question doctrine. 2
It is therefore understandable that Justice O'Connor offers little
authority for her claim that standing is built on the "single basic idea"
of separation of powers.5" She does, however, make three attempts to
justify the contention. First, she cites dictum from Chicago & Grand
Trunk Ry. v. Wellman," a case that did not concern standing at all.55
10 Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court: A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 645, 647 (1973) (quoting H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 174 (1953)).
51 See, e.g., K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 22.04, at 427 (3d ed.
1972) ("The purpose of the law of standing is to protect against improper plaintiffs.
That should be its only purpose."); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, JR., CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 81 (2d ed. 1983) (standing turns on personal stake); C. WRIGHT,
supra note 25, § 13, at 62-63 (emphasizing the role of a personal stake rather than
justiciability in standing determinations); Scott, supra note 50, at 647; Tushnet, The
Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARM. L. REV. 1698,
1726 (1980) (courts should use standing to measure litigant interest, not to introduce
separation of powers and other concerns).
It should perhaps be mentioned that Professor Logan has recently suggested that
standing requirements be evaluated "from a separation of powers perspective." Logan,
Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 37,
41. At bottom, however, Professor Logan concludes only that the "generalized griev-
ances" cases such as Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separa-
tion of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982), should be decided on prudential rather
than constitutional grounds, and that access should be liberally granted in statutory
standing cases. See Logan, supra, at 82. Such a model would not interpret the existing
standing formulations in light of separation of powers principles as Allen proposes. In
fact, since Congress has shown no interest in providing standing for generalized consti-
tutional claims, and since statutory standing is already given the broadest of readings,
the Logan formulation appears to add little.
52 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 210 ("The nonjusticiability of a political ques-
tion is primarily a function of the separation of powers."); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, JR., supra note 51, at 109-13; C. WRIGHT, supra note 25, § 14, at 75
("[T]he concern underlying the [political question] doctrine is that of separating the
proper sphere of federal judicial power from the appropriate spheres of federal execu-
tive and legislative power.").
" See 104 S. Ct. at 3325.
54 143 U.S. 339 (1892).
55 See 104 S. Ct. at 3325 (quoting Wellman, 143 U.S. at 345). Wellman held only
that the trial judge did not err in refusing to instruct the jury that the challenged
legislation was unconstitutional as a matter of law. The Wellman Court noted, how-
ever, that the case was brought by friendly parties and warned against collusive suits




Second, she uses a quotation from Flast torn violently out of context.56
Finally, she argues that "both federal and state courts have long experi-
ence in applying and elaborating ...the pervasive and fundamental
notion of separation of powers."5 This experience would presumably
facilitate future determinations when brought to bear on standing doc-
trine. Non sequitur aside, it might have been more accurate to point
out that in few areas of American constitutional law have courts proved
more ineffective than in dealing with separation of powers.58
Allen's claim, in short, is both new and unsupported. Moreover,
as the next section concludes, separation of powers analysis simply can-
not be applied to current standing doctrine requirements.
B. Interpreting Standing Requirements Through Separation of
Powers Principles
If case law and scholarship fail sufficiently to convince you that
standing is not a separation of powers doctrine, consider how separa-
tion of powers principles might be applied to the various standing tests
fashioned by the Burger Court. Recent cases teach that a litigant is
required to demonstrate personal injury that is fairly traceable to the
actions of the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable de-
cree.5' Allen declares that a court should "rely on separation of powers
58 Justice O'Connor writes:
These questions and any others relevant to the standing inquiry must be
answered by reference to the article III notion that federal courts may
exercise power. . . only when adjudication is "consistent with a system of
separated powers and [the dispute is one] traditionally thought to be capa-
ble of resolution through the judicial process" . ...
104 S. Ct. at 3325 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 97) (interpolations by O'Connor, J.).
Recall that Flast held specifically that standing questions do not raise separation
of powers principles. See supra text accompanying notes 44-47. The sentence quoted
by Justice O'Connor actually reads: "[T]he Article III prohibition against advisory
opinions reflects the complementary constitutional considerations [that] ... [flederal
judicial power is limited to those disputes which confine federal courts to a role consis-
tent with a system of separated powers and which are traditionally thought to be capa-
ble of resolution through the judicial process." Flast, 392 U.S. at 97 (emphasis added).
57 104 S. Ct. at 3325.
" See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS:
A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980); see also M.
PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY IN
THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY 37-60
(1982).
The present state of the political question doctrine is a good example of the
problems with separation of powers analysis. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 25, §
14, at 74 ("No branch of the law of justiciability is in such disarray as the doctrine of
the 'political question.' "); Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85
YALE L.J. 597, 599-600 & 600 n.8 (1976).
0 See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
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principles to interpret"60 these standards.
At the start, it is far from simple to determine exactly what "sepa-
ration of powers principles" are. The Allen opinion itself offers no
meaningful guidance.61 From other contexts, however, we can conclude
that a healthy judicial concern for separation of powers would seek to
avoid either intruding upon the work of another branch of government
or performing a function that the Constitution allocates to another
branch.62 Standing tests that require causation and redressability, how-
ever, have nothing to do with intrusion or with the allocation of deci-
sionmaking responsibility.
Suppose that the Allen plaintiffs had presented a perfect case of
causation: the Secretary of the Treasury testified that the IRS proce-
dures were promulgated solely to foster and encourage private discrimi-
natory schools for the purpose of defeating desegregation efforts, and
the private schools acknowledged that they could not exist but for the
IRS policy. Would the relief requested intrude any less into the work-
ings of the executive branch? The answer is no, and the reason it is no
is that the causation requirement has nothing to do with separation of
powers. The nature and extent of the interference with a coequal
branch of government would not vary.
We may well believe, in such a hypothetical, that judicial inter-
vention would be more justified, but that goes only to the strength of
the claim on its merits. "Traceability" (causation) merely attempts to
assure that the injury-the essential basis for federal jurisdiction-is
somehow related to the allegedly illegal actions of the defendant. Its
presence, or absence, is unrelated to intrusion on other branches.
The redressability requirement is similarly unrelated to separation
of powers. Had the Allen plaintiffs been able to demonstrate that every
discriminatory private school in the country would be forced to close its
doors if the IRS adopted tougher guidelines, their injuries would un-
doubtedly have been redressable. Given the existence of truancy laws,
integration of the public schools would inevitably increase. The plain-
tiff's requested injunction, however, would not have been any more or
less intrusive. The redressability hurdle insures that the injury that is
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
1o 104 S. Ct. at 3330 n.26.
61 See infra text accompanying notes 66-69.
62 See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 441-46 (1977) (up-
holding Congressional Act's regulation of the disposition of President Nixon's White
House materials against separation of powers challenge because the Act would not dis-
rupt executive branch functions); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 210, 226 (a federal court
voting reapportionment suit was justiciable because it did not involve questions decided
or to be decided by another branch of government).
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the basis for standing will be remedied by the invocation of judicial
power. It prevents judicial decrees that have no effect in the real world.
Like its counterpart, the causation requirement, redressability is irrele-
vant to separation of powers.63 It is difficult to imagine, therefore, how
one might use "separation of powers principles to interpret" its
demands.
In short, the tests formulated by the Supreme Court over the the
past quarter-century have been designed to measure the interest of the
litigant. The personal injury (or injury-in-fact) standard requires that
the plaintiff have something at stake in order to sue. The causation and
redressability components insure an adequate relationship between the
defendant, the cause of action, and the injury providing the basis for
standing. None of these components is logically capable of interpreta-
tion through separation of powers principles.
Another possibility exists for interpreting Justice O'Connor's bow
toward separated powers. The claim in Allen could mean that separa-
tion of powers principles should be used to skew the standing determi-
nation rather than to interpret its requirements.64 Under such a read-
ing, if a case presented both standing and justiciability problems the
two could appropriately be combined to defeat jurisdiction-not unlike
some notion of cumulative error.65 This interpretation, of course, is a
1S As a criterion for standing, "redressability" takes no account of the relative
efficacy of possible action by another branch of government. Redressability asks only
whether the judiciary can construct a useful remedy, not how favorably that remedy
compares with hypothetical cures that could be fashioned by another branch.
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Allen, offers this theory as one possible interpre-
tation of the majority's claim. See 104 S. Ct. at 3345-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" The doctrine of cumulative error permits reversal when numerous insubstantial
errors are found to have prejudiced a trial even though no single error alone would
justify a reversal. See United States v. Canales, 744 F.2d 413, 430 (5th Cir. 1984);
Payne v. Janasz, 711 F.2d 1305, 1315-16 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 552
(1983); United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 200-01 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1113 (1981).
Consider two examples. In Valley Forge, the Court refused to grant standing to a
group of taxpayers challenging the transfer of government property to a religious or-
ganization. Justice Rehnquist's opinion in the case expressed concern that an exercise
of jurisdiction in the case would affect "relationships between coequal arms of the Na-
tional Government." 454 U.S. at 473. But why is that the case? Is the decision whether
to give property to a religious organization entrusted by the Constitution to the execu-
tive branch? Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), in
which the Court denied standing in an action based upon the incompatibility clause, in
part as the result of separation concerns, raises similar questions. Deciding whether
members of Congress can also hold positions in the Armed Forces Reserve hardly seems
to endanger the independent working of the United States Congress. In these cases, the
Supreme Court could not with candor rule that the challenged decisions represented
"political questions." Therefore, under inconsistent and conclusory rationales, the
Court ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing. See Nichol, Standing on the Constitu-
tion: The Supreme Court and Valley Forge, 61 N.C.L. REv. 798, 805-19 (1983). If
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far cry from making separation of powers the grounding principle of
standing doctrine, which is what the Allen majority claims to have had
in mind. It also produces equally unsatisfactory results.
Not surprisingly, federal constitutional claims often call into ques-
tion the validity of actions of another organ of government. By defini-
tion, therefore, they raise the specter of judicial intrusion. Most often,
however, such cases cannot in good faith be deemed political If the
standing determination may appropriately be "skewed" by separation
of powers concerns in such cases, courts will be increasingly tempted
simply to deny standing on undisclosed grounds.
Allen itself is an example of such muddied decisionmaking. Al-
though it sets up separation of powers principles as the guiding light
for standing, and although it finds that the plaintiffs lack standing, the
decision sets forth no meaningful separation of powers analysis. The
Court does state that standing "counsels against" granting jurisdiction
in cases that attack the internal workings of the executive branch in
fulfilling its delegated duties.6 In the corresponding footnote, however,
Justice O'Connor explains that "our analysis . . . does not rest on the
more general proposition that no consequence of the allocation of ad-
ministrative enforcement resources is judicially cognizable. ' '67 Given
that the Court does on occasion indeed countenance substantial judicial
"restructuring" of both federal and state administrative frameworks,68
this is simply trying to have it both ways.
Had the plaintiffs prevailed, Allen itself might have produced sub-
stantial separation of powers problems. IRS enforcement policies would
have been changed and agency resources reallocated. 9 In order for the
the plaintiffs in these cases asserted no legally cognizable interest, standing should have
been denied. If their claims would have violated separation of powers principles, the
political question doctrine should have been invoked. It hardly serves article III analy-
sis, however, to use the standing doctrine to make covert and indefensible political ques-
tion determinations.
66 104 S. Ct. at 3330. See supra text accompanying note 38.
67 104 S. Ct. at 3330 n.26.
'8 See, e.g., Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151 (1981) (grant of
standing to challenge Secretary Watt's use of bidding systems for leasing tracts for
mineral exploration and development); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (up-
holding voter standing to challenge Georgia voting apportionment statute that debased
plaintiffs' right to vote in congressional election); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954) (fifth amendment prohibits executive branch from maintaining a segregated
school system).
At the state level, see Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974) (upholding injunc-
tion against unconstitutional law enforcement practices of Texas Rangers); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (school desegregation
order).
6' The separation of powers concerns in Allen were heightened by congressional
opposition to the plaintiffs' requested relief. Had the plaintiffs prevailed, the Court not
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case to be dismissed as an unjustifiable intervention into the workings
of another branch of government, however, the Court would have been
forced to explain why some such intrusions are acceptable and others
not. By using a hybrid standing analysis rather than the overt separa-
tion of powers scrutiny demanded by the political question doctrine,
Allen was able to avoid such an inquiry. The result of combining
standing analysis with separation of powers concerns, apparently, is
that neither doctrine is meaningfully addressed.
II. DISSECTING ARTICLE III
Although I have so far described Allen as a marked departure
from traditional standing doctrine, the case can also be seen as a pre-
dictable culmination of the Burger Court's treatment of article III. Al-
len brings separation of powers concerns out of the closet and expressly
makes them a part of the standing inquiry. In this sense it is a signifi-
cant change of direction, for until now even the Burger Court has
claimed that standing decisions turn on the plaintiff's personal stake. If,
however, one studies what the Burger Court has done with article III,
rather than what it has said, Allen becomes less novel.
Despite protestations to the contrary, standing decisions of the past
decade have been heavily influenced by at least four other concerns:
separation of powers,70 federalism,7 1 limits on the exercise of judicial
remedial powers,72 and the Court's view of the claim on the merits.73
only would have invaded discretionary executive branch procedures but also would
have circumvented an explicit congressional stay. See supra note 18.
70 See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976)
(court must not "overstep[] its assigned role in our system"); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974) (to adjudicate in the absence of
actual injury would "distort the role of the Judiciary in its relationship to the Executive
and the Legislature"); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (supervi-
sion of government is a congressional, not a judicial, function); Laird v. Tatum, 408
U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (monitoring of executive branch most appropriately left to Congress).
7 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983) (equitable
relief must be limited by federalism concerns); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379
(1976) (same); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499-502 (1974) (federalism counsels
refusal to interfere with state court proceedings).
72 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 488-490 (1982).
7' Compare Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (standing granted to bring equal
protection challenge against state alimony law that only applied to husbands) and
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (generous grant
of standing to uphold federal limitation on nuclear power plant liability) with O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (standing denied in challenge to alleged racial discrimi-
nation in state court system) and Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973)
(standing denied to challenge of child support laws enforced only on behalf of legiti-
mate children).
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Allen, in effect, looks to them all. The opinion explicitly embraces sep-
aration of powers concerns. Almost casually, Justice O'Connor also ar-
gues that the standing decision should be instructed by "determining
whether the complaint states a sound basis for equitable relief."7 The
opinion further implicitly suggests that interests of federalism should
play a key role in the standing determination. 7 Thus it would be less
than surprising to learn at some future date that Allen has introduced
equitable restraint and deference to local government into the standing
calculus as well. The final factor listed-the Court's view of the claim
on the merits-will likely affect the standing determination as long as
judges with strong feelings about substantive claims decide jurisdic-
tional issues. If mixing extraneous factors with standing doctrine were
a good idea, Allen would be welcome. At least federal judges have now
been given explicit direction to do what they must have suspected all
along-to deny standing if any aspect of a case seems questionable or
disconcerting. I believe, however, that the expansion of standing's um-
brella that Allen augurs will ill serve article III. Such a blending of
analyses will not induce more principled jurisdictional determinations.
A. The Standing Morass
It is not difficult to argue that the present law of standing is unsat-
isfactory. Announced principles do not explain even the major cases.
Despite the asserted requirement that a litigant demonstrate "distinct
and palpable" harm,76 the Court does on occasion hear cases in which
there is either no injury or no particularized injury.77 The fairly tracea-
ble requirement has been toughened or relaxed to suit the judicial
mood.7 8 The redressability standard has been so aggressively manipu-
lated that one would be hard-pressed to define it.79 The "zone of inter-
74 104 S. Ct. at 3330 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974)).
75 See id. at 3324. In fashioning the standing argument, Justice O'Connor took
special sustenance from City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), from Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), and from O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974). All
three cases were heavily influenced by federalism concerns. See Nichol, supra note 4, at
98-101; see also supra note 71.
78 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
77 Particularized harm has not been required in establishment clause cases. See,
e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984) (government sponsored Christmas
creche); Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983) (state tax deduction covering private
religious school tuition); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (state funds used to
purchase books for religious schools); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (federal funds
for religious schools); cf. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (particu-
larized harm need not be shown under statutory grant of standing).
78 See infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
7 Compare, e.g., Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83 (1981) (denying standing for
lack of redressability) and Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26
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est" mandate8" has often been disregarded-even when it would seem
dispositive.81 Worst of all, the Supreme Court has apparently ignored
standing requirements altogether when the Justices have found the
merits of a case particularly alluring .2 Taken together, the decisions
offer little in terms of either principle to explain divergent results or
predictability to guide decisionmaking in lower federal courts. Recalling
that standing is designed to be a relatively simple and neutral threshold
jurisdictional inquiry, it is no overstatement to characterize the Court's
treatment as unsuccessful.
In general, the shortcomings of standing doctrine flow primarily
from two sources. First, the standards designed by the Court to mea-
sure rights of access are extremely malleable. The linchpin of article
III, the personal injury requirement, is hardly self-defining. Professor
Vining has argued, in fact, that deciding whether a person has suffered
judicially cognizable harm is a significant jurisprudential venture likely
to produce both "intellectual and moral agonies." 8 Metaphysical com-
plexities aside, injury determination has at the very least proved unpre-
dictable. Similarly, causation is a notoriously unwieldy concept. As
Professor Chayes has written, the "fairly traceable" standard "can
readily be made to vary, if not with the length of the Chancellor's foot,
then with the interests and sympathies of shifting configurations of five
Justices." 4 Such open-ended concepts, without judicial elucidation,
hardly serve to cabin the jurisdictional inquiry.
Second, the Burger Court has often attempted to fill the gaps in its
vague standing guidelines by introducing factors traditionally thought
extraneous to the standing inquiry. This reliance on interests that go
beyond the scope of the litigant's stake, so energetically endorsed in
Allen, has been the primary source of the standing doctrine's woes. It
(1976) (same) and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (same) and Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 26 (1973) (same) with Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982)
(meeting redressability requirement) and Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980) (same)
and Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (same) and Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (same).
80 The zone of interest requirement is raised where plaintiffs allege a statutory
basis for standing. It requires that the plaintiff's harm be within the zone of interests
that the statute was designed to protect. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); see also K. DAVIs, supra note 51, §§ 22.02-11.
81 See K. DAVIS, supra note 51, § 22.00.
82 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984) (upholding municipal
funding for Christmas nativity display); Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983) (up-
holding state tuition tax deduction that included religious schools); Norwood v. Harri-
son, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (enjoining state provision of textbooks to discriminatory pri-
vate schools).
J. VINING, supra note 12, at 174.
84 Chayes, supra note 1, at 19.
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can hardly be expected to cure the present inadequacies.
Initially, a review of the Burger Court's attempts to work these
extraneous concerns into the standing calculus presents several analyti-
cal problems. Standing tests formulated to measure access are logically
unrelated, not only to separation of powers principles as discussed
above, but to federalism and equitable restraint as well. Whether a liti-
gant is directly injured and whether that injury will be alleviated by the
decree of a federal court provide precious little illumination of the ap-
propriate allocations of power between state and federal government.
Those cases which have brought the greatest interference with local
prerogatives-school desegregation, school prayer, and prison reform,
for example-fall easily within the injury-causation-redressability
framework.
Neither can legitimate concerns about judicial intervention
through injunctive relief against other branches of government be sensi-
bly addressed as questions of standing rather than remedy.85 Remedial
overreaching may try both judicial resources and administrative or ex-
ecutive patience. Sensitivity to these concerns, however, cannot be mea-
sured by the existence or absence of injury and causation. Nor should
remedial determinations be made at the threshold jurisdictional stage of
the litigation. Allen, and other cases seeking to employ the standing
rubric to accomplish ends beyond the examination of litigant's interest,
use directness of injury as a surrogate to decide the outcome of signifi-
cantly more complex issues.86 The surrogate, however, is logically sepa-
rate from the interests it is made to measure, and the article III deci-
sionmaking process suffers.
Standing analysis, therefore, is not the only casualty of such in-
terdoctrinal confusion. Allen is, in reality, a separation of powers deci-
sion that employs no separation of powers analysis. Similarly, City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons,8 7 in name a standing decision, turns primarily
on the propriety of injunctive relief, without employing careful reme-
dial analysis.8" Rizzo v. Goode 9 and O'Shea v. Littleton9" are federal-
ism decisions masquerading under the standing heading.91 They con-
tribute little to our understanding of federalism principles. When other
8" See Fallon, supra note 4, at 22-47, 74.
86 Cf Fallon, supra note 4, at 72 ("[T]he availability of an injunction, as well as
the form of injunctive relief, should depend on a calculus more complex than that em-
ployed by Lyons.").
87 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
88 See id. at 111-12.
89 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
90 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
" See Nichol, supra note 4, at 98-101; see also supra note 71.
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distinct considerations are folded into the standing determination, those
very issues escape thorough examination.
B. Distortions of Injury, Causation, and Redressability
The harm that cases blending various justiciability concerns inflict
upon standing doctrine is, of course, more direct. Consider, for exam-
ple, the three cornerstones of the standing inquiry: injury, causation,
and redressability. Each reflects the results of judicial tampering
designed to serve interests other than measurement of the litigant's per-
sonal stake in the controversy. The most extreme fluctuations in the
Court's decisions accepting or rejecting various asserted harms have re-
sulted from judicial attempts to include analysis of separation of pow-
ers, federalism, or equitable restraint concerns. This tampering has, in
turn, contributed heavily to the incomprehensibility of the present
standing doctrine. The injury component of standing is particularly
vulnerable to distortion. In Lyons, police applied a nearly fatal
chokehold to a black youth stopped for a minor traffic infraction. Lyons
sued to enjoin continued use of the chokehold, but was denied standing.
The Supreme Court expressed concern-as part of its standing deter-
mination-that such lawsuits would push federal remedial powers be-
yond acceptable bounds and interfere with local prerogative.92 Lyons
was found to have asserted no cognizable injury.
By contrast, consider the harm found to be sufficient in United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP).93 Law student environmental activists brought suit to enjoin
the Interstate Commerce Commission from approving higher freight
rates without conducting an environmental impact study. The students
alleged that higher rates would discourage recycling, thereby increasing
the consumption of natural resources and harming the plaintiff's aes-
thetic and recreational interests in hiking and camping in the forests
surrounding the District of Columbia.9" Can one reasonably argue that
Lyons's continuing fear of the Los Angeles police practices that almost
killed him once was not as distinct and palpable a harm as that suf-
fered by the students in SCRAP?
More striking is a comparison of Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co.95 with Warth v. Seldin.98 The plaintiffs in Trafficante,
92 See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112.
93 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
9 Id. at 675-76.
95 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
96 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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who brought suit pursuant to the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 97 achieved
standing based upon injury to their right to the "benefits from interra-
cial association.""' Three years later, in Warth, various residents of
Penfield, New York, brought an action based upon constitutional
rather than statutory grounds.99 Although they alleged injury identical
to that suffered by the Trafficante plaintiffs,"' the claim was held not
judicially cognizable. The Supreme Court distinguished Trafficante be-
cause of the existence of the Fair Housing Act. A statutory grant of
standing does indeed alleviate concerns over separation of powers.101
But is article III analysis well served when injury to the same interest
is judicially cognizable on one occasion but not on the next?
Finally, consider United States v. Richardson. °"2 The litigants in
Richardson complained that the CIA's refusal to publish its budget vi-
olated the accounts clause. 0 ' The Burger Court easily dismissed the
claim as a mere "generalized grievance" that failed to meet the injury
standard.0 Yet had there been a statute mandating disclosure, such as
the Freedom of Information Act, injury to that statutorily created inter-
est would almost certainly have provided a basis for standing. 0 The
Court's concern for separation of powers, 0 6 therefore, led it to the sur-
prising conclusion that a constitutionally imposed freedom of informa-
tion obligation could not support an injury claim, but that a statutory
obligation could. 10 7 Other injury-distorting examples abound. 08 It is
9 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1982).
98 409 U.S. at 210. See also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363
(1982) (upholding standing for same injury).
The plaintiffs alleged that Penfield's zoning ordinances effectively barred low
and middle income individuals from obtaining housing in the town, thus abridging the
plaintiffs' first, ninth, and fourteenth amendment rights and violating 42 U.S.C. §§
1981-1983 (1982).
100 See 422 U.S. at 512.
101 But see McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265, 271 (D. Idaho) (even explicit
congressional grant of standing cannot establish jurisdiction if controversy lies outside
article III), affld mem. sub nom. McClure v. Reagan, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981).
102 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
103 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("[A] regular Statement and Account of the
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published . .
104 418 U.S. at 176-77.
105 Cf. id. at 204-05 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that in dismissing the case
for lack of injury, the majority would be bound to deny even a congressionally author-
ized obligation such as the Freedom of Information Act because those denied informa-
tion would still lack the injury required for article III standing).
106 See id. at 179 (cases such as Richardson would transform our governmental
structure into "an Athenian democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee the
conduct of the National Government by means of lawsuits in the federal courts").
107 See id. at 178 & n.11.
108 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation
of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). Com-
pare Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) with
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clear, however, that the Supreme Court has offered its most aberrant
injury rulings in cases in which the standing principle was manipulated
to serve other justiciability concerns.
The causation or "fairly traceable" requirement has been most
distorted in similar circumstances. In deferring to separation of powers
interests in Allen-and on other occasions when the Court preferred to
avoid a decision on the merits-the Court has converted the causation
component into an anachronistic demand for specific pleading. 0 9 Nor-
mal pleading presumptions are inverted and the Court appears to read
the complaint with "antagonistic eyes."110 In other cases, however,
where a statutory grant of standing has swept away separation of
power concerns, the Court has found article III requirements perfectly
consistent with post-World War II concepts of notice pleading.'
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The antiwar activist plaintiffs in Schlesinger
claimed a violation of the incompatibility clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 ("[N]o
Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House
during his Continuance in Office."), by members of Congress who simultaneously held
commissions in the armed forces. As injury, the litigants alleged harm to their ability to
achieve effective, nonbiased representation in Congress, especially with regard to ques-
tions about the Vietnam War. In the denial of standing, Chief Justice Burger at-
tempted to distinguish the suit from voting reapportionment cases. He described the
allegations in Baker as based upon "concrete injury to fundamental voting rights, as
distinguished from the abstract injury in nonobservance of the Constitution." 418 U.S.
at 223 n.13. The Chief Justice was quite sure, however, that to grant standing would
have posed a grave threat to the appropriate separation of powers. See 418 U.S. at 223.
But why was the action in Schlesinger characterized as "abstract," while a reap-
portionment plaintiff's injury was deemed to be "concrete"? If concreteness turns on
the impact upon the plaintiff then the cases appear analogous. Both represent attempts
to alleviate intangible impediments to a citizen's ability to be heard in the legislature.
Moreover, the reapportionment plaintiff's right has been described as "fundamental."
Since San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973), it has
been understood that "fundamental rights" are those either explicitly or implicitly pro-
tected by the Constitution. Under that definition, the right asserted in Schlesinger
under the incompatibility clause is at least as fundamental as the right presented in
Baker.
101 The Allen majority ruled that the complaint contained no allegation that the
tax benefits received by private segregated schools "make an appreciable difference in
public-school integration." 104 S. Ct. at 3328. In dissent, Justice Stevens was unable to
understand the majority's reading of the complaint "unless the Court requires 'intrica-
cies of pleading that would have gladdened the heart of Baron Parke.'" Id.. at 3343
n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1305 (1976)). Justice Brennan, in his dissent,
quoted extensively from the plaintiff's complaint, leaving one hard pressed to justify the
majority's ruling. See id. at 3336-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Similar inversions of normal notice pleading presumptions can be found in Simon
v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 45-46 (1976); Wa-rth, 422 U.S. at
508.
110 Warth, 422 U.S. at 518 ( Douglas, J., dissenting).
m For example, in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), the
Court refused to dismiss a claim based upon harm to the "benefits of interracial as-
sociations" even though the complaint did not establish that the defendants' conduct
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Neither the plaintiff's personal stake nor the directness of the line of
causation can explain these results.
The redressability hurdle has also been raised or lowered to meet
unspoken demands. The standard generally demands a showing that
the plaintiffs' injury is "likely" 112 to be or exhibits a "substantial likeli-
hood"1 ' of being redressed by the requested relief. However, when the
Court has been especially concerned about interference with federal ad-
ministrative prerogative, the language of the standard has been changed
to demand a showing that the "relief will remove the harm." 1 4
More important, this standard, like injury and causation, has also
been inconsistently applied to accomplish nonstanding ends. To avoid
interfering with local prosecutorial discretion, the Court concluded in
Linda R.S. v. Richard D.11 5 that a criminal sanction is not likely to
affect private behavior.1 6 Both Allen 117 and Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Organization1 8 effectively presume that private
actors are not substantially likely to alter their behavior in order to
obtain tax-exempt status. These surprising results may reflect under-
standable judicial hesitancy to interfere with the workings of executive
agencies. But when the treatment of redressability in these cases is com-
pared with its relatively lenient applications on other occasions,19 the
had anything to do with the neighborhoods in which the plaintiffs lived. Id. at 376-77.
Pointing to "liberal federal pleading standards," the Court found dismissal on the
pleadings "inappropriate" absent further factual development. Id. at 377-78.
Similarly, in Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980), plaintiffs were allowed to
contest a ruling on irrigation rights, claiming harm to their ability to purchase land,
even in the absence of specific pleadings concerning their financial ability to buy the
property. 447 U.S. at 367 n.17. But cf. Warth, 422 U.S. at 504-07 (denying standing
in part because plaintiffs did not allege their ability to purchase homes in exclusionary
zoning suburb).
112 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982) (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village
of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 501)); Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 262 (1977)
(quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)).
... Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 75 n.20
(1978).
114 See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 45 (1976) (quot-
ing Warth, 422 U.S. at 505).
115 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
118 Id. at 618.
117 104 S. Ct. at 3328-29 ("[I]t is entirely speculative. . . whether withdrawal of
a tax exemption from any particular school would lead the school to change its
policies.").
118 426 U.S. 26, 42-43 (1976).
119 See, e.g., Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268
(1979); Regen'- of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Duke Power Co.




conclusion that standing turns on judicial whim seems almost
unavoidable.
While using the standing doctrine to serve other justiciability
goals, the Court continues to leave "core" standing issues unredressed.
If, for example, a number of factors appear to cause a litigant's injury,
including the allegedly illegal acts of the defendant, must the plaintiff
prove with the certainty that Simon and Warth seem to require that
this suit will remove her harm? In a complex world where government
action pervades private decisionmaking, it may often be difficult to es-
tablish with certainty what has caused an injury or what will assure its
removal. A standing requirement that demands certitude would reflect
a significant value determination that it is more important to avoid gra-
tuitous adjudications than to leave governmentally caused injuries un-
redressed. In other contexts, the Supreme Court has invalidated govern-
ment action that merely contributed to a litigant's injury.1"' Do
subsequent developments in standing doctrine now forbid such results?
If answers to these and similar are to be provided, the Court must be-
gin to treat the standing doctrine as significant in its own right-rather
than as a tool. to be manipulated to accomplish unexplained goals.
C. Standing at the Brink
The key to constructing a comprehensible standing doctrine is to
keep it close to home. Standing doctrine was designed to measure the
litigant's stake. It serves as a poor surrogate either for defining the role
of the federal judiciary or for covert rulings on the merits. If a case
threatens the appropriate separation of powers, it should be dismissed;
but it should be dismissed under a doctrine that considers such intru-
sion as its decisive factor-that is, the political question doctrine. If a
claim threatens to embroil the federal courts in matters more appropri-
ately left to local decisionmakers, then it should be dismissed on feder-
alism grounds. The plaintiffs should not be sent home under the fiction
that they have no stake in the controversy. If an action poses the danger
120 See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369 (1967); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963). All these cases
involved racial discrimination.
Standing's unanswered questions are perhaps too numerous to mention. Examples
that merit attention, however, include the following: When and why is specific pleading
of causation demanded? Why are some intangible constitutional claims (for example,
separation of church and state) "generalized grievances," while others (for example,
vote dilution in reapportionment cases) "distinct and palpable" harms? Or why is my
subjective desire that the government comply with the Constitution intangible, while
my subjective desire that the government protect the environment in national parks is
tangible?
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of injunctive overreaching, that danger can best be avoided at the reme-
dial stage. It is hardly necessary to deny jurisdiction. If the Supreme
Court dislikes the substance of the claim presented, it should either
deny certiorari or dismiss the claim on its merits. Allen, in short, moves
standing doctrine in the wrong direction.
It may well be, however, that the Supreme Court has no desire to
make sense of the standing doctrine. As the doctrine presently exists,
standing can apparently be either rolled out or ignored in order to serve
unstated and unexamined values. And what a remarkable set of values
the standing doctrine has been forced to serve.
The Burger Court has raised the toughest standing hurdles in
cases in which minorities have challenged exclusionary zoning prac-
tices,121 patterns of police brutality, 22 and judicial 23 or administra-
tive 24 bias. Poverty plaintiffs have been barred from challenging the
discriminatory enforcement of child support obligations, 125 and the tax-
exempt status of hospitals that deny them emergency medical ser-
vices.' 26 Litigants seeking to prevent government from contributing val-
uable property to a religious organization'17 and to force public disclos-
ure of the CIA budget128 have similarly fallen before an aggressive
standing doctrine.
On the other hand, standing requirements have been eased in cases
sustaining the constitutionality of the federal subsidy for the nuclear
power plant industry, 29 upholding Secretary Watt's offshore leasing
policy,' affirming the propriety of tuition tax credits to private
schools,' and condoning government support for chaplains3 2 and
121 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
122 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362 (1976).
123 See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
124 See Allen, 104 S. Ct. 3315.
125 See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
128 See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
127 See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
128 See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
129 See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
110 See Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151 (1981).
121 See Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
132 See Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983). Marsh involved the liberal
use of standing to obtain a conservative result. The Court granted taxpayer standing to
challenge a governmentally funded chaplaincy, see id. at 3332 n.4., then upheld the
chaplaincy. See Nichol, Standing on the Constitution: The Supreme Court and Valley
Forge, 61 N.C.L. REV. 798, 815-16 (1983).
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Christmas creches.1 33 One could perhaps be forgiven for confusing
standing's agenda with that of the New Right.
MS See Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984). The Burger Court has gener-
ously granted standing only in cases where plaintiffs have raised statutory grounds for
standing. This exception accounts for the only recent cases reaching more liberal re-
sults. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (racial discrimi-
nation in housing); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 164 n.15 (1978)
(protection of endangered species).
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